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1 Introduction
This paper evaluates the portfolio allocation behavior of participants in defined contribution (DC) plans, taking
account of the possibility that such pension plan investors may be influenced by the prospect of regret. For
example, if the return on a specific asset turns out to be very high when a worker retires, he might regret not
having allocated a large enough portion of his contributions to that asset. Conversely, if the stock market does
poorly, the retiree might regret having invested in the stock market. Such anticipated disutility from regret is
particularly important in the context of a DC pension, since most participants select an initial asset allocation
when they join the plan but often do not manage their retirement accounts actively thereafter.1
Regret theory was developed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) and axiomatized by Sugden (1993)
and Quiggin (1994). In that work, as here, regret is defined as the disutility of not having chosen the ex-post
optimal alternative. Behavior compatible with such a preference structure has been observed in many contexts,
where it often explains deviations from expected utility models traditionally used in the finance and insurance
literature (cf Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Loomes,1988; Baron and Hershey, 1988; Loomes et al. 1992; Starmer
and Sugden, 1993; Connolly and Reb, 2003). Recently regret theory has been applied by Braun and Muermann
(2004) to insurance demand, and by Gollier and Salanie (2005) to risk-sharing and asset pricing in a complete
market setting. To date, researchers have not focused on how regret might alter investor behavior.
In the present paper, our goal is to examine the eﬀect of regret on investment behavior and participants’ value
of guarantees in DC pension plans. Section 2 assesses how regret can influence the asset allocation decision in a
retirement account, between risk-free and risky assets. To protect retirees against capital market risk, some have
suggested that participants would benefit from financial products that will protect them against down-side asset
fluctuations (c.f. Lachance and Mitchell, 2003). It is interesting that Germany and Japan recently mandated that
DC participants be oﬀered a principal-guaranteed account, on the grounds that this will make defined contribution
plans more attractive to unsophisticated participants (Maurer and Schlag, 2003). In Section 3, we evaluate the
impact of regret on participants’ willingness-to-pay for a guarantee on the risky asset. Section 4 oﬀers concluding
remarks and areas for further research. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1Agnew et al (2003), in a study of 401k plan participants, report that the vast majority (87 percent) of participants had no annual
trades; over a four year period, only a single trade took place per participant. Similarly, Ameriks and Zeldes (2000) show that almost
half of all TIAA-CREF participants made no changes in their asset allocations at all during the decade 1987-96. Additionally,
Madrian and Shea (2001) find employees procrastinate in making or implementing savings decisions in 401(k) plans of large U.S.
corporations.
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2 The Impact of Regret on Portfolio Allocation
We begin by examining investment behavior in a DC setting under regret aversion. Suppose an investor has
initial wealth w0 which he can allocate between a risky and a risk-free asset. The return of the risky asset is
given by a random variable R which is distributed according to some cumulative distribution function F , whereas
the risk-free asset yields a deterministic return rf . In making his portfolio choice, the investor takes into account
the fact that he may regret having made an investment decision that proves to be suboptimal ex-post. For
example, if the return on the risky asset turns out to be very high, the investor might regret not having allocated
his total wealth to the risky asset. In the contrary case, if the return of the risky asset turns out to be very low
or negative, the investor could regret having allocated any wealth to the risky asset at all.
To examine the impact of regret on the participant’s ex-ante allocation of wealth, we follow the approach of
Braun and Muermann (2004) to pose the investor’s preferences as a two-attribute Bernoulli utility function
uk (w) = u (w)− k · g (u (wmax)− u (w)) .
Here w = w0 (1 + αR+ (1− α) rf ) is the actual level of wealth and wmax is the ex-post optimal level of final
wealth, i.e. the level of wealth that results from the optimal ex-ante allocation had the investor known the realized
return of the risky asset. The first attribute accounts for risk aversion and is characterized by the investor’s utility
function u (·) with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. The second attribute relates to the fact that the investor is concerned
about the prospect of regret. The function g (·) measures the amount of regret that the investor experiences,
which depends on the diﬀerence between the value he assigns to the ex-post optimal level of wealth wmax that
he could have achieved, and the value that he assigns to his actual final level of wealth w. The parameter k ≥ 0
measures the importance of the second attribute “regret” relative to the traditional first attribute expressive of
risk aversion. We assume that g (·) is increasing and strictly convex, i.e. g0 > 0 and g00 > 0, which implies
regret-aversion. For k = 0, the investor would simply be a traditional risk-averse expected utility maximizer, i.e.
u0 (w) = u (w).
To determine the ex-post optimal level of final wealth wmax for this investor, we must distinguish the cases
when the risky asset’s realized return exceeds the risk-free rate, R ≥ rf , from when R < rf . In the first case,
the regret-averse investor would have wanted to invest all wealth in the risky asset, whereas in the second case it
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would have been optimal to invest all wealth in the risk-free asset. Therefore
wmax =



w0 (1 +R)
w0 (1 + rf )
if
R ≥ rf
R < rf
.
We now compare how anticipation of regret influences the investor’s optimal asset allocation. Let α∗k denote
the optimal fraction invested in the risky asset by an investor with regret parameter k ≥ 0 where α∗0 = α∗. The
following proposition shows that a regret-averse investor will always “hedge away from the extremes.” In other
words, compared to a traditional risk-averse investor, he will select a riskier portfolio allocation if the equity
premium is low, and a more moderate portfolio allocation if the equity premium is high.
Proposition 1 If E [R]− rf = 0 then α∗k > 0 for all k > 0 whereas α∗0 = 0. If E [R]− rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))]
then α∗k < 1 for all k > 0 whereas α∗0 = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The regret-averse investor always invests a positive amount of his wealth in the risky asset (here, termed
stocks), even if the equity premium equals zero; by contrast, a risk-averse investor would hold all risk-free assets
(here, termed bonds) in that case. Additionally, for a suﬃciently large equity premium, the regret-averse investor
always invests a positive amount in the risk-free asset, whereas the risk-averse investor holds all stocks. This
may be explained intuitively, by noting that taking an extreme position, e.g. all riskless, exposes the investor to
the possibility of facing extreme regret if stocks do well. By avoiding all bonds, the worker will feel less regret
if stocks do well but, in return, he will feel some regret if they do poorly. Regret aversion, i.e. convexity of g,
leads to suboptimality of extreme decisions.
In the following proposition, we show that higher regret amplifies the eﬀect of “hedging one’s bet.”
Proposition 2 If the investor weights regret more strongly, relative to risk aversion, as measured by k, then for
E [R]− rf = 0 he invests more in the risky asset, whereas for E [R]− rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] he invests less in
the risky asset, i.e.
∂α∗k
∂k > 0 if E [R]− rf = 0
∂α∗k
∂k < 0 if E [R]− rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))]
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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In other words, the more regret-averse the participant, the more likely he will be to hold stock in his portfolio
as long as the equity premium, E [R] − rf , is low. Conversely, he will hold less stock if the equity premium is
high.
In the next proposition, we show that there exists a risk-free rate of return brf , and therefore a level of equity
premium, where regret has no impact on the investor’s optimal fraction invested in the risky asset. That is, a
regret-averse investor holds the same portfolio allocation as a risk-averse investor, at that equity premium.
Proposition 3 There exists brf such that 0 < E [R]− brf < Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))E[u0(w0(1+R))] and α∗k = α∗0 for all k > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In other words, for some intermediate level of the equity premium, a regret-averse investor chooses a portfolio
allocation as if he did not consider regret.
We summarize our findings in Figure 1. The equity premium is on the x-axis and the optimal level of
investment in the risky asset is depicted on the y-axis. With a zero equity premium, the risk-averse investor
would invest all of his wealth in the risk-free asset (α∗0 = 0). By contrast, the regret-averse investor would place
some of his wealth in the stock (α∗k > 0). As the level of regret aversion rises, i.e. k2 > k1, the amount of wealth
invested in the stock increases. With a relatively large equity premium, the risk-averse investor allocates all of
his wealth to stock (α∗0 = 1), while the regret-averse investor invests some money in the risk-free asset (α∗k < 1).
As the level of regret aversion increases, with a high equity premium, the amount of wealth invested in stock
decreases.
Our results therefore imply that pension plan participants with regret-averse preferences will select portfolio
allocations “less extreme” than those predicted by conventional expected utility. If a very risky portfolio were
selected by a purely risk-averse worker, his regret-averse counterpart will elect a less risky portfolio; conversely,
when the purely risk-averse individual is predicted to chose a non-risky portfolio, the regret-averse individual
would prefer a riskier portfolio. In essence, individuals who are regret-averse will tend to “hedge their bets,”
taking into account the possibility that their decisions may turn out to be ex-post suboptimal. Note that for an
equity premium that is suﬃciently high, these predictions can help explain the equity premium puzzle.
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Figure 1: Asset Allocation under Regret Aversion
3 Guarantees: Mitigating Regret and Willingness-To-Pay
Next we assume that a guaranteed rate of return on the risky asset is made available. Guarantees may help
mitigate the regret experienced by investors, by protecting their wealth in states of the world where realized stock
outcomes are poor. The benefit of a guarantee is valuable for high levels of investment in the risky asset. For
example, an investor with a substantial portion of his wealth in stocks who finds himself in a state of the world
with a low realized return on this investment would experience a great deal of regret from having made such
a decision. Of course, a guarantee on an investment would oﬀer some wealth protection, which would reduce
the individual’s feeling of regret. Certainly this regret mitigation feature of a guarantee is most beneficial when
the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset is high. On the other hand, a guarantee also introduces an
additional cost to regret-averse investors. Ex-post, it is optimal to have either invested all wealth in the risky
asset, or all in the risk-free asset. Buying a guarantee therefore could exacerbate ex-ante regret.
A range of pension guarantee mechanisms might be contemplated for DC pension plans, though in practice
they tend to take the form of either a rate of return guarantee or a minimum benefit guarantee. In the present
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paper, we focus on the former structure, wherein a pension manager commits to return to the worker his or her
contributions plus some stipulated rate of return. A variation on this is a principal guarantee, simply equivalent
to guaranteeing a nominal rate of return of zero percent. By contrast, Feldstein and Samwick (2001) have
suggested an alternative for the US, namely a real principal guarantee; a more generous plan still might promise
to pay back contributions plus the 10-year Treasury bond return.
The costs of providing such guarantees depends, of course, on how the guarantees are designed.2 First, it
matters how often the promise must be kept. For example, it might be suﬃcient to structure the program
so that the minimum return is evaluated only at the worker’s retirement date, rather than annually or more
frequently.3 Second, the cost of the pension guarantee depends on how much investment risk is borne by the
DC plan investor. Participants could make the guarantee more valuable, and hence more costly, if they have
an opportunity to chose riskier DC plan assets after receiving the guarantee. This moral hazard problem has
been recognized by Bodie and Merton (1993) and Smetters (2002), among others, and it has prompted some
countries to impose portfolio restrictions on investors’ DC pension asset allocations. For instance, Mexico and
Chile originally required that DB plan participants hold an all-bond portfolio. Alternatively, employers could
oﬀer workers in DC plans some protection from market fluctuations without mandating a risk-free portfolio. This
can be accomplished by providing a guaranteed return on the risky asset (Turner and Rajnes, 2003; Walliser,
2003).
In this section, we examine how investors might value a pension guarantee by comparing the Willingness-To-
Pay (WTP) for such a guarantee for a regret-averse versus a risk-averse investor. The WTP is derived from an
indiﬀerence relation between a portfolio with and without the guarantee, and thus it provides a measure of how
much an individual values the guarantee.4
Let rg ≥ −1 be the guaranteed return on the risky asset. The return of this contingent contract is therefore
Rg = max (R, rg).5 As noted above, the guarantee does not alter the ex-post optimal level of final wealth wmax.
The ex-post optimal decision is to invest one’s entire portfolio in the risky asset, if its realized return is above the
risk-free rate of return, and all of it in the risk-free asset if otherwise, i.e. wmax = w0 (1 +max (R, rf )).
2 See, for instance, Lachance et al. (2003) and Mitchell and Smetters (2003).
3Pennachi (1999) and Fischer (1999) note that a more frequent minimum bar could be set, as in Chile, where pension plans must
meet an annual minimum threshold, or in Columbia, where three-year periods are used.
4Boulier et al. (2001) and Deelstra et al. (2003) derive optimal investment strategies of DC plan managers in the presence of
minimum guarantees. In this paper, we are concerned with how plan participants diﬀerently value guarantees depending on whether
they are regret-averse or not.
5Alternatively, the guaranteed return could apply to the entire portfolio. Our results extend to this case by redefining rg accordingly.
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Let Pk (rg, α¯) denote the maximum price the investor with regret parameter k ≥ 0 is willing to pay for the
guaranteed return rg, if his risky asset allocation were fixed at α¯.6 His WTP Pk (rg, α¯) is then determined by
the following indiﬀerence equation
E [uk (w0 (1 + α¯R+ (1− α¯) rf ))] = E [uk (w0 − Pk (rg, α¯)) (1 + α¯Rg + (1− α¯) rf )] . (1)
Obviously, if no guarantee is provided, rg = −1, the investor’s WTP is zero, i.e. Pk (−1, α¯) = 0 for all
0 ≤ α¯ ≤ 1. In addition, if the investor’s wealth were fixed all in bonds, his WTP for the stock guarantee is zero,
i.e. Pk (rg, 0) = 0 for all −1 ≤ rg ≤ rf .
In the following proposition, we show that a regret-averse investor values the guarantee less than the risk-
averse investor, when the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset is low. However, if the fraction of wealth
invested in the risky asset is high, and the level of guaranteed return is low, a regret-averse investor will find the
guarantee more valuable than the risk-averse investor.
Proposition 4 Pk (rg, α¯) < P0 (rg, α¯) for low levels of α¯ and all rg and Pk (rg, α¯) > P0 (rg, α¯) for high levels of
α¯ and low levels of rg.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
If the portfolio share in the risky asset is low, the regret-averse investor would be willing to pay less for the
guarantee than would a risk-averse investor. In this case, the benefits of the guarantee in mitigating regret are
low and outweighed by its added “regret cost” through the price. In contrast, when investment in the risky asset
is high and the guaranteed rate of return low, the benefits of regret mitigation would be high, outweighing its
cost. A regret-averse investor then values the guarantee more than a risk-averse investor.
4 Conclusions and Future Research
The last three decades have brought a dramatic transformation in the pension institution, with defined benefit
plans being replaced by defined contribution plans. In the traditional DB context, employers hired sophisticated
money managers to make asset allocation decisions; in DC pensions, by contrast, individual participants now
bear the risk and consequences of their pension asset allocation patterns. Recent research in behavioral finance
6We fix the investor’s portfolio allocation to mitigate the moral hazard problem of investors rebalancing their portfolio due to the
provided guarantee.
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suggests that workers faced with having to save and invest for their own retirement often fail to behave as
conventional expected utility models would predict.7
This paper shows how regret can influence investor portfolio allocations in such individually-managed DC
pensions. We also illustrate how much a regret-averse investor might be willing to pay for a rate of return
guarantee on the risky asset, given a fixed portfolio allocation. Our results show that regret moves investors’
decisions away from the extremes, if no guarantee is present. That is, investors who take regret into account will
hold more stock when the equity premium is low, but less stock when the equity premium is high. This result
may explain the equity premium puzzle, since for a suﬃciently high equity premium a regret-averse investor will
hold less stock than a risk-averse investor. We also show that regret-averse investors value return guarantees
less than purely risk-averse investors, when the investment in the risky asset is small. Conversely, regret-averse
investors value return guarantees more than risk-averse investors when the investment in the risky asset is large
and the return guarantee is small. This work therefore has implications for eﬀorts to add a DC component to a
national Social Security system and the likely importance of guarantees in this context (c.f. Cogan and Mitchell,
2003).
Extensions of our research might be fruitful. For instance, van der Hoek and Sherris (2001) have proposed a
risk measure that has a concave distortion function above a given reference point, but a convex distortion function
below that point. It would be interesting to translate their work to the regret context, using the ex-post optimal
level of wealth as the relevant reference point. Additionally, we could investigate what happens if the fraction
of the DC pension plan invested in risky assets cannot be fixed ex-ante. In this case, it would be of interest to
ask whether there is an incentive-compatible contract which would still permit an attractive guarantee, without
being prohibitively expensive.
7Mitchell and Utkus (2004) review several instances of such problems in the DC pension context.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The investor’s optimization program is
max
α∈[0,1]
E [uk (w (α))] = E [u (w (α))− k · g (u (wmax)− u (w (α)))] , (2)
where w (α) = w0 (1 + αR+ (1− α) rf ) and wmax = w0 (1 +max (R, rf )) denote the investor’s final level and
ex-post optimal level of wealth. The first- and second-order conditions for (2) are
dE [uk (w (α))]
dα = E [w0 (R− rf )u
0 (w (α)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w (α))))] = 0 (3)
and
d2E [uk (w (α))]
dα2 = E
h
w20 (R− rf )
2 u00 (w (α)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w (α))))
i
(4)
−E
h
w20 (R− rf )
2 ku02 (w (α)) g00 (u (wmax)− u (w (α)))
i
< 0.
As E [uk (w (α))] is strictly concave in α, any solution of (3) determines the unique global maximum. The first
derivative (3) can be decomposed into
dE [uk (w (α))]
dα =
dE [u0 (w (α))]
dα +
rfZ
−1
kw0 (r − rf )u0 (w (α)) g0 (u (w (0))− u (w (α))) dF (r)
+
∞Z
rf
kw0 (r − rf )u0 (w (α)) g0 (u (w (1))− u (w (α))) dF (r) .
Evaluating the first derivative at α = 0 and α = 1 yields
dE [uk (w (α))]
dα |α=0 =
dE [u0 (w (α))]
dα |α=0 + kw0g
0 (0)u0 (w (0))
rfZ
−1
(r − rf ) dF (r) + kw0u0 (w (0))
+
∞Z
rf
(r − rf ) g0 (u (w (1))− u (w (0))) dF (r)
> dE [u0 (w (α))]dα |α=0 + kw0g
0 (0)u0 (w (0)) (E [R]− rf )
= w0u0 (w (0)) (E [R]− rf ) (1 + kg0 (0))
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and
dE [uk (w (α))]
dα |α=1 =
dE [u0 (w (α))]
dα |α=1 +
rfZ
−1
kw0 (r − rf )u0 (w (1)) g0 (u (w (0))− u (w (1))) dF (r)
+
∞Z
rf
kw0 (r − rf )u0 (w (1)) g0 (0) dF (r)
< dE [u0 (w (α))]dα |α=1 + kw0g
0 (0)E [(R− rf )u0 (w (1))]
= w0E [(R− rf )u0 (w (1))] (1 + kg0 (0)) .
If E [R] − rf = 0 then dE[uk(w(α))]dα |α=0 > 0 for all k > 0, and if E [R] − rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] then
dE[uk(w(α))]
dα |α=1 < 0 for all k > 0. This implies that α∗k > 0 for all k > 0 in the first situation and α∗k < 1 for all
k > 0 in the latter.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Taking the total diﬀerential of the first-order condition (3) with respect to α and k leads to
∂2E [uk (w (α))]
∂α2
¯¯
α=α∗k · dα+
∂2E [uk (w (α))]
∂α∂k
¯¯
α=α∗k · dk = 0
and therefore
∂α∗k
∂k = −
∂2E[uk(w(α))]
∂α∂k
¯¯
α=α∗k
∂2E[uk(w(α))]
∂α2
¯¯
α=α∗k
.
As ∂
2E[uk(w(α))]
∂α2
¯¯
α=α∗k < 0
sign
µ
∂α∗k
∂k
¶
= sign
µ
∂2E [uk (w (α))]
∂α∂k
¯¯
α=α∗k
¶
.
The cross-partial derivative equals
∂2E [uk (w (α))]
∂α∂k
¯¯
α=α∗k = E [w0 (R− rf )u
0 (w (α∗k)) g0 (u (wmax)− u (w (α∗k)))] .
From the FOC (3) we imply
dE [uk (w (α))]
dα
¯¯
α=α∗k =
dE [u0 (w (α))]
dα
¯¯
α=α∗k + k ·
∂2E [uk (w (α))]
∂α∂k
¯¯
α=α∗k .
As dE[uk(w(α))]dα
¯¯
α=α∗k = 0 we have
sign
µ
∂α∗k
∂k
¶
= sign
µ
∂2E [uk (w (α))]
∂α∂k
¯¯
α=α∗k
¶
= −sign
µ
dE [u0 (w (α))]
dα
¯¯
α=α∗k
¶
. (5)
If E [R]−rf = 0 then α∗0 = 0 and α∗k > 0 for all k > 0 according to Proposition 1. This implies
dE[u0(w(α))]
dα
¯¯
α=α∗k>0 <
0 and thus ∂α
∗
k
∂k > 0 by (5). If E [R]− rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] then α
∗
0 = 1 and α∗k < 1 for all k > 0 according
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to Proposition 1. This implies dE[u0(w(α))]dα
¯¯
α=α∗k<1 > 0 and thus
∂α∗k
∂k < 0 by (5).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
For any fixed k > 0 we have have shown in Proposition 1 that
α∗k > 0 and α∗0 = 0 if E [R]− rf = 0
α∗k < 1 and α∗0 = 1 if E [R]− rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))]
.
The Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists brf (k) with E [R]−Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))E[u0(w0(1+R))] < brf (k) < E [R]
such that α∗k = α∗0 at this risk-free rate of return. The following first order conditions
dE [u (w (α))]
dα
¯¯
α=α∗0 = E [w0 (R− brf (k))u0 (w (α∗0))] = 0
and
dE [uk (w (α))]
dα
¯¯
α=α∗0 = E [w0 (R− brf (k))u0 (w (α∗0)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w (α∗0))))] = 0
lead to the condition
E [w0 (R− brf (k))u0 (w (α∗0)) g0 (u (wmax)− u (w (α∗0)))] = 0.
As this condition is independent of k we conclude that brf (k) = brf for all k ≥ 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The WTP Pk (rg, α) of an investor is implicitly defined through (1)
E [uk (w0R (−1, α¯))] = E [uk ((w0 − Pk (rg, α¯))R (rg, α¯))]
where R (rg, α¯) = 1 + α¯Rg + (1− α¯) rf and Rg = max (R, rg). The regret-averse investor is willing to pay less
for the guarantee than the risk-averse investor, i.e. Pk (rg, α) < P0 (rg, α¯) for all rg, if and only if
E [u ((w0 − Pk (rg, α¯))R (rg, α¯))] > E [u ((w0 − P0 (rg, α¯))R (rg, α¯))] = E [u (w0R (−1, α¯))]
for all rg. Define the function f : [0, 1]→ R as
f (α¯) = E [u ((w0 − Pk (rg, α¯))R (rg, α¯))]− E [u (w0R (−1, α¯))] . (6)
For α¯ = 0 we have f (0) = 0. To prove that Pk (rg, α¯) < P0 (rg, α¯) for small α¯ and all rg we thus have to show
that f 0 (0) > 0. Diﬀerentiating f with respect to α¯ yields
f 0(α¯) =


−∂Pk∂α¯ E[R (rg, α¯)u0 ((w0 − Pk (rg, α¯))R (rg, α¯))]
+E[(w0 − Pk (rg, α¯)) (Rg − rf )u0 ((w0 − Pk (rg, α¯))R (rg, α¯))]
−E[w0 (R− rf )u0(w0R (−1, α¯))]


and thus
f 0(0) = u0 (w0 (1 + rf ))
·
−∂Pk (rg, α¯)∂α |α=0 (1 + rf ) + w0E[(Rg −R))]
¸
. (7)
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Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to α¯ implies
E [w0 (R− rf )u0(w0R (−1, α¯)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0R (−1, α¯))))]
=
·
−∂Pk∂α¯ E [R (rg, α¯)u
0((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u ((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯))))]
+E [(w0 − Pk) (Rg − rf )u0((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u ((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯))))]
¸
where Pk = Pk (rg, α¯). For α¯ = 0 we get
w0u0 (w0 (1 + rf ))E [(R− rf ) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf ))))]
=
·
−∂Pk(rg,α¯)∂α¯ |α¯=0 (1 + rf )u0(w0 (1 + rf ))E [(1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf ))))]
+w0u0(w0 (1 + rf ))E [(Rg − rf ) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf ))))]
¸
which implies
∂Pk (rg, α¯)
∂α¯ |α¯=0 =
w0E [(Rg −R) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf ))))]
(1 + rf )E [(1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf ))))]
. (8)
Substituting (8) into (7) yields
f 0 (0) = w0u0 (w0 (1 + rf ))
µ
−E [(Rg −R) (1 + kg
0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf ))))]
(1 + rf )E [(1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf ))))]
+E [Rg −R]
¶
= − w0u
0 (w0 (1 + rf )) k
E [1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf )))]
· Cov (Rg −R, g0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf )))) .
We have
Cov (Rg −R, g0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 + rf )))) = Cov (Rg −R, g0 (u (w0 (1 +max (R, rf )))− u (w0 (1 + rf )))) < 0
and thus f 0(0) > 0. This implies f(α¯) > 0 for small α¯ as f (0) = 0 and therefore Pk (rg, α¯) < P0 (rg, α¯) for small
α¯ and all rg.
Next, we would like to show that Pk (rg, α¯) > P0 (rg, α¯) for large α and small rg. This holds if and only if
f(α¯) < 0 for large α and small rg (see (6) for the definition of f (·)). We have
f(1) = E[u (((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))]−E[u (w0 (1 +R))].
At rg = −1, f(1)|rg=−1 = 0. Diﬀerentiating f (1) with respect to rg implies
∂f(1)
∂rg
= −∂Pk∂rg
|α¯=1E[(1 +Rg)u0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))] +E[∂Rg∂rg (w0 − Pk (rg, 1))u
0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))]
= −∂Pk∂rg
|α¯=1E[(1 +Rg)u0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))] + (1 + rg) (w0 − Pk (rg, 1))u0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 + rg))
Evaluating at rg = −1 yields
∂f(1)
∂rg
= −∂Pk∂rg
|α¯=1,rg=−1E[(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R))].
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Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to rg implies"
−∂Pk∂rg E [R (rg, α¯)u
0((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u ((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯))))]
+E
h
(w0 − Pk) ∂Rg∂rg u
0((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u ((w0 − Pk)R (rg, α¯))))
i # = 0 (9)
where Pk = Pk (rg, α¯). For α¯ = 1 we get·
−∂Pk∂rg |α¯=1E [(1 +Rg)u0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u ((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))))]
+ (1 + rg) (w0 − Pk)u0((w0 − Pk) (1 + rg)) (1 + kg0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u ((w0 − Pk) (1 + rg))))
¸
= 0
Evaluated at rg = −1 implies ∂Pk∂rg |α¯=1,rg=−1 = 0 and thus
∂f(1)
∂rg |rg=−1 = 0. Diﬀerentiating again implies
∂2f(1)
∂r2g
=


−∂
2Pk
∂r2g
|α¯=1E[(1 +Rg)u0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))]
−∂Pk∂rg |α¯=1E[
∂Rg
∂rg u
0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))]
+
³
∂Pk
∂rg |α¯=1
´2
E[(1 +Rg)2 u00((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))]
−∂Pk∂rg |α¯=1 (w0 − Pk (rg, 1))E[(1 +Rg)
∂Rg
∂rg u
00((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 +Rg))]
+ (w0 − Pk (rg, 1))u0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 + rg))
− (1 + rg) ∂Pk∂rg |α¯=1u0((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 + rg))
− (1 + rg)2 (w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) ∂Pk∂rg |α¯=1u00((w0 − Pk (rg, 1)) (1 + rg))


At rg = −1 we have ∂Pk∂rg |α=1 = 0 and thus
∂2f(1)
∂r2g
|rg=−1 = −
∂2Pk
∂r2g
|α¯=1E[(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R))] + w0u0(0).
Diﬀerentiating (9) again with respect to rg and evaluating at α¯ = 1 and rg = −1 implies"
−∂
2Pk
∂r2g
|rg=−1E [(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 +R))))]
+w0u0(0) (1 + kg0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0)))
#
= 0
and hence
∂2Pk
∂r2g
|rg=−1 =
w0u0(0) (1 + kg0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0)))
E [(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 +R))))]
Therefore
∂2f(1)
∂r2g
|rg=−1
= − w0u
0(0) (1 + kg0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0)))
E [(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 +R))))]
E[(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R))] + w0u0(0)
=
kw0u0(0)E [(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R)) (g0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 +R)))− g0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0)))]
E [(1 +R)u0(w0 (1 +R)) (1 + kg0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 +R))))]
For R < rf we have
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g0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 +R)))− g0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0))
= g0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (w0 (1 +R)))− g0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0)) < 0
For R > rf we have
g0 (u (wmax)− u (w0 (1 +R)))− g0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0))
= g0 (0)− g0 (u (w0 (1 + rf ))− u (0)) < 0
Therefore ∂
2f(1)
∂r2g
|rg=−1 < 0. As f(1)|rg=−1 = 0 and ∂f(1)∂rg |rg=−1 = 0 we thus derived f(1) < 0 for small guarantee
levels, i.e. close to rg = −1. This in turn yields Pk (rg, α¯) > P0 (rg, α¯) for large α¯ and small rg.
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